



ANALYSIS

Recommendations to Strengthen the EU's Economic Security Cooperation

April 2026

Executive summary

The EU's economic security agenda has evolved rapidly in response to rising geopolitical tensions and the growing use of economic statecraft. While the EU has rapidly introduced a set of defensive instruments, international cooperation on economic security has progressed more slowly. As a result, many policy tools are currently deployed primarily at the unilateral level, which risks creating unintended effects on trade with trusted partners and reduces the overall effectiveness of these tools. This analysis examines how the EU could strengthen cooperation with trusted partners as part of its economic security strategy. It finds that existing cooperation – through formats such as the G7, bilateral partnerships, digital partnerships and FTAs – provides a foundation but that further development is possible.

We therefore present ten suggestions aimed at strengthening the EU's economic security cooperation. These include expanding economic security partnerships, improving coordination on anti-coercion and defensive instruments, building broader coalitions for rules-based trade, strengthening crisis preparedness in FTAs, deepening digital cooperation, developing trusted procurement frameworks, widening cooperation against non-market practices, enhancing OECD cooperation and improving public-private dialogue on economic security. Together, these measures could help anchor the EU's economic security policy more firmly in international cooperation, strengthen resilience in critical supply chains and support open and predictable trade and investment with trusted partners.

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1 Introduction

The last decade has seen the politicisation of access to technology such as semi-conductors, the weaponisation of European energy supplies after the Russian invasion of Ukraine, more assertive behaviour by China and the US levying high tariffs on the EU and other trading partners. In response to this rapidly changing geopolitical and geoeconomic context, the EU is increasingly focusing on the security aspects of its international economic relations.

In 2023, the European Commission proposed an Economic Security Strategy, which introduced a common framework for achieving economic security by promoting the EU's economic base and competitiveness, protecting against risks and partnering with the broadest possible range of countries to address shared concerns and interests (European Commission, 2023a). The EU strategy thus combines the introduction of trade-restrictive instruments with the pursuit of diversified trade ties with trusted partners. The recent Communication further outlines the EU's economic security approach and indicates a more active geoeconomic Commission while the commitment to deepening trade and investment relations with other countries persists (European Commission, 2025a).

At the same time, multilateral agreements of relevance to trade and economic security – such as the WTO or the Wassenaar Arrangement – face serious challenges, gridlock or are dysfunctional due to geopolitical tensions and disagreements among its members. The EU has instead initiated bilateral economic security cooperation with partners such as Japan and Canada. However, these remain relatively informal and limited to a very small number of trading partners. As a result, the EU's economic security instruments are wielded largely unilaterally, separate from the framework of existing forms of international economic cooperation.

Accordingly, we have previously suggested that the EU should develop its economic security partnerships into more formalised cooperation, with the aim of facilitating trusted and reliable trade with a larger set of partners (National Board of Trade, 2025a). **The purpose of this analysis is to explore how the EU could develop its economic security partnerships.** We evaluate, especially, the possibility of strengthening cooperation on economic security in EU FTAs and other trade-related formats. The analysis first provides a brief background on the EU's approach to economic security and then describes the EU's economic security cooperation as it stands today. Following that, the analysis discusses potential improvements to the EU's economic security cooperation, before concluding.

2 The EU's evolving economic security policy

In 2023, the European Commission proposed an Economic Security Strategy, which introduced a common framework for achieving economic security by promoting the EU's economic base and competitiveness, protecting against risks and partnering with the broadest possible range of countries to address shared concerns and interests (European Commission, 2023a). In 2024, a package of defensive instruments – spanning topics such as investment screening, export controls and research security – was introduced (European Commission, 2024a). In 2025, the European Commission further outlined its approach to the policy area through a Communication on EU Economic Security (European Commission, 2025a).

Although the EU's economic security agenda is still evolving, several steps have already been taken to enhance the bloc's resilience and protect its strategic interests. One important avenue is trade diversification, for which the EU's bilateral and regional trade liberalisation agenda has been central. The EU has recently concluded negotiations on free trade agreements (FTAs) with a number of partners, including India, Mercosur and Indonesia. Moreover, targeted trade offers such as digital trade agreements, digital partnerships and clean trade and investment partnerships (CTIPs) have promoted strategic liberalisation with trusted partners. The EU has also more recently entered into a structured dialogue for enhanced cooperation with the CPTPP¹ countries, which constitutes another important avenue for diversifying trade flows towards trusted partners that believe in rules-based trade (National Board of Trade, 2025b). The EU has also developed several defensive instruments (see Figure 1 below). For example, the EU has introduced an investment screening mechanism, is looking into outbound investment screening and has proposed more coordinated export controls (European Commission, 2024a; European Commission, 2025b). The EU has also developed an anti-coercion instrument (ACI), which allows it to respond to economic coercion. Moreover, the EU's International Procurement Instrument and enforcement regulation could also be viewed through an economic security lens, allowing responses to protectionist practices by other countries (European Commission, 2022a).

Industrial policy programmes such as the EU Chips Act and Important Projects of Common European Interest (IPCEI) have been developed with an economic security imperative (IMF, 2024a). In addition, domestic preference schemes limiting funding or procurement towards local suppliers are increasingly being discussed, not least in relation to the recent proposal for an Industrial Accelerator Act (IAA), illustrating a tilt towards an industrial policy approach that is not necessarily supported empirically (National Board of Trade, 2025c).


Additionally, the Internal Market Emergency and Resilience Act (IMERA) has provided a tool for anticipating and addressing emergencies, while cybersecurity tools are also seen as supporting economic security (European Commission, 2025c). In relation to recent trade tensions, the wider EU policy debate has also seen arguments

¹ Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership

that several of the EU's legal instruments, including regulations and standards, could be politicised and used for geoeconomic purposes (see, e.g., Gehrke, 2025).

Overall, the development and emerging deployment of these instruments, as well as the debate around them, have blurred the distinction between EU goals and tools spanning economic, security and regulatory fields. In concert, this development constitutes a move towards more unilateralism, which may in some instances be legitimate or required due to risks and external pressure, but can also come with costs and risks of its own. It is therefore important to ensure that the EU wields its economic security toolbox in a manner that is as cooperative as possible and protects its reputation as a predictable and constructive player governed by the rule of law.

Figure 1. A non-exhaustive list of tools supporting EU economic security



Source: European Commission (2025)

3 The EU's economic security cooperation

A key avenue for improving predictability towards unilateral defensive instruments is multilateral agreements or standards on the use of such instruments. One such avenue is the WTO, which is a forum where progress on new rules governing trade has been blocked for years due to its consensus-based decision model and distinct disagreements among its broad membership. Another avenue, where several EU member states participate, is the Wassenaar Arrangement. That is a multilateral forum on export controls² that is currently challenged by its consensus-based decision model and a membership base that includes Russia, a war aggressor threatening Europe's security and often an intended subject of Europe's export controls (CSIS, 2023). Accordingly, regional and bilateral cooperation on economic security has grown more common. This includes leveraging existing FTAs to fulfil economic security priorities and forming partnerships for dialogue, coordination and regulatory alignment. Common areas of cooperation include supply chain resilience, cybersecurity, research security and standards. This section provides an overview of the EU's economic security cooperation and a few factors that may impact its future development.

For the EU, a key avenue for cooperation on economic security has been the G7. In their May 2023 statement, the G7 Leaders committed to strengthening cooperation on economic security through enhanced strategic coordination to reduce vulnerabilities, counter non-market policies and economic coercion, and protect sensitive technologies, while upholding the WTO-centred rules-based system. They focused on building resilient and diversified supply chains (particularly for critical minerals, semi-conductors and batteries), strengthening critical infrastructure (not least in the digital domain) and supporting developing countries through partnerships such as the Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment. The G7 also launched a Coordination Platform on Economic Coercion to improve early warning, information sharing and coordinated responses. Moreover, they announced collaboration on international standards for digital technologies and intended alignment of tools to prevent leakage of critical and emerging technologies that could threaten international peace and security (European Council, 2023).

Moreover, the EU has developed several bilateral formats for cooperating on economic security. For example, Trade and Technology Councils (TTC) have been established with the US and India, respectively. TTCs are bilateral cooperation fora through which the EU seeks to achieve strategic coordination with key partners on trade, technology and supply chains. They are designed to deepen transatlantic and international cooperation in areas such as digital governance, emerging technologies, resilient value chains and the green transition, while promoting shared values and reducing strategic dependencies (European Commission, 2021a; European Commission, 2025g). While the EU-India TTC remains active, cooperation with the US through the TTC has stalled. Instead, the US is promoting its initiative Pax Silica (US Department of State, 2025). That initiative suggests cooperation on supply chain integration and security, cybersecurity and countering non-market practices. Another

² See <https://www.wassenaar.org/>

US-led initiative it is promoting is the recently announced FORGE, targeting access to critical minerals and rare earths (US department of State, 2026).

In addition to its TTCs, the EU has also developed digital partnership agreements and upgraded several FTAs with digital trade agreement. These serve as cooperation formats seeking regulatory alignment for the digital economy, including for measures of importance to economic security, such as cybersecurity and critical technology (European Commission, 2025h). One example is the EU's bilateral relationship with Korea, which includes a digital partnership signed in 2022. Initially, cooperation on economic security within the digital partnership revolved primarily around increasing supply chain resilience. However, it has evolved into more structured collaboration on research, regulation and standardisation, and information sharing on critical ICT. In its current form, the partnership includes cooperation on infrastructure and emerging technologies, such as quantum computing, 5G/6G, AI and critical goods such as semiconductors, as well as promoting research collaboration (European Commission, 2022b). Regulatory cooperation has focused on mutual recognition of standards for ICT (including interoperability), as well as AI, data- and platform governance. Moreover, the partnership is likely to evolve further with the conclusion of negotiations for a digital trade agreement, in part owing to the flexibility of the digital partnership agreement, and previous economic cooperation including an FTA, strategic partnerships, previous sectoral agreements³, and so on.

Towards developing country partners, the EU has also used its Global Gateway, memoranda of understanding (MoUs) on critical minerals, and Clean Trade and Industrial Partnerships (CTIPs) in part to promote economic security (European Commission, 2025j). The EU has funding, capital products and structures for development financing (for example, the Global Gateway Initiative), which it can use in critical raw material cooperation (European Commission, 2024b). In addition, the EU has included some critical raw material aspects into FTAs. For example, EU FTAs with Mercosur, Indonesia and Namibia include facilitating investments in critical raw material supply chains by lowering trade and investment barriers and creating joint investments projects in the extraction and processing of critical minerals (European Commission, 2025d; European Commission, 2025e; European Commission, 2025f).

In addition, the EU has sought to establish dedicated economic security partnerships with partners such as Japan and Canada. EU economic security cooperation with Japan has emerged on top of previous agreements, most notably the EU–Japan Strategic Partnership Agreement, the EU–Japan Economic Partnership Agreement and the EU–Japan Digital Partnership (European Union, 2019; European Commission, 2019; European Commission, 2022c). Joint dialogues in 2025 reaffirmed cooperation on economic security, including challenges pertaining to non-market practices, such as overcapacity (European Commission, 2025k). Similar to relations with South Korea, the digital partnership includes cooperation on resilient supply chains for critical ICT (AI, quantum computing, 5G/6G, and semiconductors), regulatory cooperation and data governance, as well as submarine cable infrastructure. This includes research

³ See e.g., European Commission (2007).

collaborations, extension of funding opportunities and coordination of standards and certifications for ICT products and services. In terms of the semiconductor supply chain, the parties commit to efforts such as the exchange of information, joint monitoring of supply chain disturbance/weaknesses and promoting joint development.

With Canada, the EU has signed both a strategic partnership on raw materials and a security and defence partnership that enable deeper integration of raw material supply chains (European Commission, 2021b; European Commission, 2025l). This includes facilitating investments in exploration, extraction, processing and recycling (for example, through matching investors with mining firms, creation of joint funding ventures and accelerating public funding), enhanced research cooperation and information exchange on extraction and processing technology. Cooperation on raw materials is part of a more comprehensive institutional framework, comprising a digital partnership and the provisionally applied Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA) (European Commission, 2023b). The EU and Canada are also negotiating a digital chapter within CETA, focusing on cooperation on AI and quantum, alignment of technological framework and standards, and the linking of high-performance computing infrastructure (European Commission, 2025m).

Bilateral arrangements, while supportive of the G7 cooperation, have arguably become more important since US trade policy has become less predictable even towards its allies. The US is a long-term key ally to Europe in security and economic terms that has long promoted an approach of working with partners, not least the EU, through formats such as the G7 and bilaterally through the TTC. However, recently, the US approach has shifted towards a more unilateral/US-led approach, with initiatives such as Pax Silica and FORGE.

Moreover, the evolution of new US trade agreements creates an imperative for the EU to consider how it wants to extend its own economic security cooperation beyond Canada and Japan. The US has recently concluded several trade deals, including new approaches to economic security alignment with countries in Latin America (for example Argentina, El Salvador and Guatemala) and Asia (South Korea, Japan, Cambodia, Malaysia, etc.) (Council on Foreign Relations, 2026). Two examples that illustrate this shift in policy are the agreements with Malaysia and Cambodia which include provisions on alignment of export controls, investment security, import restrictions (screening and information-sharing) and responses to non-market activity (such as subsidies) by third party countries (White House, 2025a; White House, 2025b). In addition, these agreements include collaboration on critical minerals. These agreements are asymmetrical in the sense that they oblige the trade partners to follow US trade and economic security policies towards third countries to maintain the agreement (a so-called “poison-pill clause”) (Global Trade Alert, 2025). They also restrict the countries from partnering with other countries insofar as it “jeopardises essential US interests” (White House, 2025a, 2025b). As a result, trade and integration with these countries may become more difficult, posing a challenge for EU interests.

The European Commission (2025a) outlines three key areas for the EU’s future plans on economic security cooperation. First, the EU seeks to strengthen close cooperation with trusted partners, both bilaterally and within the G7 and CPTPP countries, as well

as through other plurilateral fora. This will include focused dialogues, the coordinated use of policy tools and coalition-building to jointly assess risks, anticipate threats and support resilient supply chains. Second, the EU aims to develop and promote targeted economic security standards, particularly for critical raw materials and semi-conductors, with the aim of diversifying supply chains, ensuring transparency and interoperability, and remaining consistent with international rules. Third, economic security will be integrated more systematically into enlargement and neighbourhood policy, ensuring candidate countries align with the EU's approach and gradually integrate into the Single Market to reinforce collective resilience.

4 Potential improvements to EU economic security cooperation

We conclude that the degree of unilateralism with which the EU's economic security instruments are currently being deployed is suboptimal. Unilateral trade-restrictive measures may negatively impact trade even with trusted and low-risk partners, thereby causing collateral damage. In addition, the effectiveness of economic security instruments may be reduced if tools are deployed unilaterally rather than through a coalition of partners.

Moreover, despite concerted efforts toward issues like supply chain resilience, diversification and capacity-building, the EU's international cooperation on economic security has received criticism for not being proactive enough. Calls have been made for greater coordination and alignment with partners on economic security instruments, such as export controls, anti-coercion and investment screening, as well as pooling resources in strategic technologies (Ghiretti, 2025; Ghiretti, 2026; Benford, 2025). While dialogues and commitments on economic security cooperation exist throughout the agreements surveyed here, as well as in G7 talks, these could be further developed. Some existing initiatives could benefit from expansion, others from further formalisation, and in some areas, we see the potential for new initiatives on economic security cooperation.

This section therefore outlines potential areas where we believe the EU's economic security partnerships could be further developed.⁴

1. **Expand and connect the network of economic security partnerships.** The EU's economic security partnerships remain few in number, despite intimate trading relationships with deeply trusted partners. The EU should deepen economic security partnerships with countries including Korea, the UK and Australia (for which the recent conclusion of the EU–Australia FTA is an important building block). The EU could also connect its economic security partnerships, for example those it has with Japan and Canada. This entente could then serve to bring coordinated and proactive suggestions to the G7, which in turn could help make relations with the US more predictable.
2. **Develop more systematic anti-coercion cooperation.** The EU's approach to anti-coercion remains unilateral. The anti-coercion instrument, however, offers a legal basis to coordinate retaliatory measures against economic coercion with partners (European Commission, 2023c). Moreover, the EU has already begun discussing joint approaches to countering economic coercion within the G7 framework (European Council, 2023). Building on that, the EU should develop a more systematic approach to coordinating and practicing anti-coercion with partners. If progress in the G7 is challenging, the EU could initiate such cooperation first with Japan and Canada – with whom economic security partnerships have already been established – and then expand it to partners such

⁴ We recognise, however, that certain policy tools in the area of economic security fall within member states' competence and may thus be more challenging to negotiate or harmonise with external partners.

as the UK, Korea and Australia. Initial priorities should be mapping areas of common strategic indispensability and potential joint responses against coercers. A more long-term goal could be building some sort of framework inspired by Nato's Article 5 – meaning coordinated responses against economic coercion, as has been suggested by Cha et al (2026). That would, however, require further analysis on member state competences, potential risks and other factors.

- 3. Explore further information exchange on export controls, FDI screening and similar schemes.** Export controls, investment screenings and similar schemes are increasingly wielded unilaterally by the EU – or sometimes even by individual member states. In order to increase the effectiveness of these instruments – and minimise harm to trade with trusted partners – the EU could explore the possibility for further information exchange on export controls, FDI screening, data security and research security. This avenue of cooperation could, in turn, benefit from more harmonised approaches to export controls and FDI screening among EU member states (National Board of Trade, 2025a).
- 4. Explore further OECD cooperation on economic security.** The OECD is a leading organisation for analysis and a platform for cooperation among a larger group of market economies, many of which the EU shares goals and values with. The EU should therefore explore what further role the OECD could play in advancing economic security cooperation. This could build on existing cooperation in the steel committee, the data free flow with trust (DFFT) initiative, cooperation on trusted technology (e.g., semiconductors) and research and data on resilient supply chains (see OECD, 2025). Further cooperation could include the development of OECD-wide principles on economic security policies, including investment screening, export controls, trusted technology supply chains, and potentially plurilateral agreements. It could also include exploring cooperation on stockpiling of critical raw materials within the International Energy Agency.
- 5. Spearhead the construction of a rules-based trade coalition.** The EU's economic security would benefit from a coalition of partners that agree to rules-based trade and where commercially meaningful trade liberalisation can continue. As we have previously suggested, the EU should therefore spearhead a rules-based trade coalition (RBTC) together with the CPTPP countries⁵ and as many EU free trade agreement partners as possible. The premise of an RBTC would be to build a set of commercially meaningful, rules-based norms and agreements that support rules-based trade. One key priority could be to align rules of origin to a higher degree (National Board of Trade, 2025b).

⁵ While China is seeking membership of the CPTPP, we deem it unlikely that the country will meet the conditions for entry. As such, increased EU–CPTPP cooperation is unlikely to add risk to the EU.

6. **Develop crisis preparedness clauses in FTAs.** The EU's international cooperation on crisis preparedness remains relatively informal. The EU should strengthen crisis preparedness in its FTAs by making cooperation more operational and systematic, including through FTA committees that identify essential goods and services, develop joint contingency plans, stress-test supply chains and simplify customs procedures. The EU should negotiate new or updated FTA provisions to support emergency trade facilitation, and, where needed, complement FTAs with targeted trade-related agreements to enhance resilience and diversification (National Board of Trade, 2025d). This could also include engaging in preparedness conferences together with trade partners and their private sector and exploring cooperation on joint emergency stocks ('smart stockpiling') (OECD, 2024).
7. **Expand digital partnerships and digital trade agreements.** The EU's international cooperation on digital trade remains fragmented. The EU should continue expanding coverage of digital partnerships and modern digital trade agreements, including by upgrading the FTAs with India and Mercosur. The EU should also negotiate a larger digital free flow area by synchronising its various digital partnerships, TTCs and digital trade agreements. A key part of the process should be including economic security standards on trusted digital vendors.⁶
8. **Negotiate frameworks for trusted procurement.** The EU debate on public procurement risks harming its reputation among trusted partners. The EU should acknowledge continued adherence to the WTO's government procurement agreement (GPA) with other GPA members. It should negotiate frameworks on trusted public procurement together with trusted partners. This could include developing – together with partners – further economic security standards and resilience criteria regarding, for example, digital technology, critical raw materials and other areas of strategic importance. It should be noted that the design of a 'European preference' currently being discussed in the EU could challenge the feasibility of this proposal and harm the EU's ability for economic security cooperation with trading partners (García Bercero & Poitiers, 2025; García Bercero et al, 2026).
9. **Seek wider partnerships against non-market practices.** Many of the EU's trading partners face risks from non-market practices that may lead to excess capacities. The EU should seek wider cooperation against such practices. This should include low- and middle-income countries impacted by non-market practices that may benefit from cooperation on countering these. The cooperation could include capacity development initiatives, information exchange and early warning alerts. To incentivise such cooperation, the EU should avoid protectionist industrial policies aimed at home-shoring and rather diversify trade towards trusted partners who play by the rules, including low-

⁶ Preliminary evidence shows that trust and security is more important than geographic distance for this "new globalisation". See e.g., van der Marel (2026).


and middle-income countries. Partners of particular interest could be India, Indonesia, Mexico, Kenya and other large middle-income countries.

10. Institute a trade and investment conference for economic security.

Improving public–private cooperation on economic security is essential. The EU should initiate an annual trade and investment conference for economic security, inviting both public and private sector actors from trusted trading partners. This could include countries outlined in the rules-based trade coalition (see priority 5). The goal should be to highlight potential barriers to diversification of trade and investment towards trusted partners. Additionally, the conference could help mobilise development finance towards goals such as diversification, for example, through the EU’s Global Gateway and CTIPs.

The above list will likely need to be complemented by further initiatives in the future. But these ten suggestions in concert would help move the EU’s trade and economic security partnerships towards a pyramid of integration illustrated theoretically in Figure 2 below. The figure indicates how the EU could approach cooperation on economic security with partners of varying trust. Deeper integration implies greater pooling of sovereignty. Hence, deeper integration requires a higher level of trust. The integration pyramid creates an incentive for trading partners to earn the EU’s trust – and a corresponding disincentive to lose it. Finally, because sovereignty loss is a source of domestic political conflict, the design of cooperation that implies deep integration must be sufficiently anchored in the member states with due respect to competences and sovereignty for various foreign- and security-policy issues.

Figure 2. Pyramid of preferences for EU economic security



5 Conclusion

The EU's economic security agenda has evolved rapidly in response to a more contested geopolitical and geoeconomic environment. A growing set of defensive instruments has been developed with the aim of strengthening the Union's ability to manage risks related to certain trade and investment relations. At the same time, the development of such instruments highlights the importance of embedding economic security policies within a framework of international cooperation. When defensive measures are developed – and deployed – primarily at the unilateral level, there is a risk of unintended effects on trade with trusted partners and reduced effectiveness in addressing the underlying security concerns.

The EU strategy rightly emphasises cooperation with partners as a central pillar of economic security. However, current forms of cooperation remain somewhat limited and fragmented compared with the rapid development of new policy instruments. Existing initiatives – including G7 coordination, bilateral economic security partnerships and cooperation through FTAs, digital partnerships and other trade-related formats – are positive, but there is potential for deeper and wider cooperation. Strengthening structured cooperation with trusted partners is therefore essential.

The ten suggestions outlined in this analysis aim to support such a development. Together, our suggestions seek to expand and deepen the EU's network of economic security partnerships, strengthen coordination on anti-coercion, improve information exchange on instruments such as export controls and investment screening, and promote broader cooperation on issues such as digital trade, procurement, crisis preparedness and non-market practices. The suggestions also promote wider coalitions for rules-based trade, strengthening cooperation within institutions such as the OECD, and improving public–private dialogue on economic security.

A more coordinated approach could help reduce collateral effects of unilateral measures and increase the effectiveness of defensive or risk-mitigating instruments. It could also help maintain the EU's reputation as a predictable and rules-based actor at a time when economic statecraft is increasingly used in global economic relations. As such, by strengthening partnerships with trusted economies and integrating economic security considerations into existing trade and investment frameworks, we hope that the EU can better manage emerging geoeconomic risks while continuing to benefit from global trade and international cooperation.

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Sammanfattning på svenska

Summary in Swedish

EU:s agenda för ekonomisk säkerhet har utvecklats snabbt som svar på ökande geopolitiska spänningar och den växande användningen av ekonomisk statskonst. Medan EU snabbt har infört en uppsättning defensiva instrument har unionens internationella samarbete inom ekonomisk säkerhet utvecklats långsammare. Som ett resultat används många verktyg för ekonomisk säkerhet på unilaterala nivå, vilket riskerar att skapa oavsiktliga effekter på handeln med betrodda partner och minska den effektiviteten i verktygen. Denna analys undersöker hur EU skulle kunna stärka samarbetet med betrodda partner som en del av sin strategi för ekonomisk säkerhet. Den konstaterar att befintligt samarbete – genom format som G7, bilaterala partnerskap, digitala partnerskap och frihandelsavtal – utgör en grund men att ytterligare utveckling är möjlig.

Vi presenterar därför tio förslag som syftar till att stärka EU:s samarbete om ekonomisk säkerhet. Dessa inkluderar att utöka partnerskap för ekonomisk säkerhet, förbättra samordningen kring instrument mot tvång och defensiva åtgärder och stärka krisberedskapen i frihandelsavtal. Det inkluderar också att bygga bredare koalitioner för regelbaserad handel, fördjupa digitala samarbeten, utveckla betrodda upphandlingsramverk, bredda samarbetet mot icke-marknadspraxis, utforska mer OECD-samarbete och förbättra den offentlig-privata dialogen om ekonomisk säkerhet. Tillsammans skulle dessa åtgärder kunna bidra till att förankra EU:s ekonomiska säkerhetspolitik i internationellt samarbete, stärka motståndskraften i kritiska leveranskedjor och stödja öppen och förutsägbar handel och investeringar med betrodda partner.

The National Board of Trade Sweden is the government agency for international trade, the EU internal market and trade policy. Our mission is to facilitate free and open trade with transparent rules as well as free movement in the EU internal market.

Our goal is a well-functioning internal market, an external EU trade policy based on free trade and an open and strong multilateral trading system.

We provide the Swedish Government with analyses, reports and policy recommendations. We also participate in international meetings and negotiations.

The National Board of Trade, via SOLVIT, helps businesses and citizens encountering obstacles to free movement. We also host several networks with business organisations and authorities which aim to facilitate trade.

As an expert agency in trade policy issues, we also provide assistance to developing countries through trade-related development cooperation. One example is Open Trade Gate Sweden, a one-stop information centre assisting exporters from developing countries in their trade with Sweden and the EU.

Our analyses and reports aim to increase the knowledge on the importance of trade for the international economy and for the global sustainable development. Publications issued by the National Board of Trade only reflect the views of the Board.

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